PERSONALITY, REALITY PROOF OF EXISTENCE OF SUPREME SELF

Personality and Reality

Preface

The rapid expansion of the physical sciences during the nineteenth century had its inevitable effect upon the previously high estimate of consciousness and personality ; and although, during its last decades and the past quarter-century, a marked reaction has occurred in the sphere of philosophy, no analysis of the place and function of mind has to my knowledge yet been presented which maintains conclusions so definite as those offered in the ensuing chapters. On the contrary, the standpoint long since definitely expressed by Westcott is generally accepted unquestioningly. " No arguments ", he held, " can establish the existence of an Infinite Personal God. It is a primary intuition and not a deduction. No reasoning can establish its truth." His attitude, I believe, is contrary to that of Roman Catholicism, resting as this does in part at least on the deductions of Scholasticism. But other writers continue In maintain the same negative point of view. " If God is thus a primary datum of our nature ", argues a recent author, " it is obvious that His existence cannot in any proper sense of the term be proved. It lies at the root of things ; it is a postulate, necessary for the explanation of the universe, but not itself explained by being brought under anything higher or more fundamental than itself."

 

From the specific standpoint of the scientist, again, Professor E. W. Hobson asserts (in his Gilford Lectures) the strict neutrality of scientific conclusions so far as the theistic issue is concerned. "If no philosophical assumptions are made which lie outside the necessities of Natural Science, the position of Natural Science in relation to theism ... is one of neutrality or independence." My own position, however, as will be seen from the detailed course of my argument, which must of course be judged on its own merits, is altogether different; for without any appeal to extraneous " philosophical assumptions ", it appears to me possible to attain quite positive conclusions.

Allied to this is the widespread impression that the ontological proof of the existence of God received its death-blow from the hand of Kant, although in my own opinion there are already distinct signs in current discussion that Hegel's rehabilitation of this method is capable of further development. This estimate, however, is by no means general. " The three old-fashioned theistic proofs", continues Professor Davidson, "have their use ; but it is not that of a logical proof of the Divine existence. They are all attempts (each in its own way) to fill in with content the conception of God, whose existence is already supposed." Equally well known are the philosophic scepticism of the Earl of Balfour, and what may be called the Impersonalism of Mr. Bradley and Dr. Bosanquet.

It is important, however, that the limitations of my own position be observed ; and I have referred to these familiar aspects of the modern situation only to illustrate, by way of contrast, the aim of the present volume. This is in no direct sense theological. I have limited my consideration to the problem of the real existence of a Supreme Self ; but whether this Self should further be regarded as Divine, with any current religious significance, or whether it should be named " God " or any equivalent appellation, are additional questions with which I have not concerned myself ; and I have made no argumentative use of either term. At the same time, some of the theological implications of my con-elusion are at once obvious.

Similarly I have neither dealt with the classic onto-logical arguments nor presented a mere variant of Paley's point of view. On the contrary, my treatment is based throughout on the analysis first of the nature of Mind, and secondly of Matter, solely in the light of modern Psychology and Physics. The facts of Materialism therefore on the one hand, and the principle of Involution on the other, are unreservedly accepted. Apart from these, indeed, my general argument would possess no basis whatever; for taken in conjunction, paradoxical though it may seem, they constitute the foundation of my whole position. I may add that a philosophic defence of the real existence of the material world has already been offered in my Theory of Direct Realism.

At the same time I should like to observe that the subject was approached with no preliminary bias whatever in favour of my final conclusions, nor again with any view to elaborating some philosophic support for a presupposed standpoint. On the contrary, the opening chapters were prepared with not the least suspicion of the direction ultimately taken by the argument. This indeed may literally be said to have developed itself quite independently of my own anticipation and intention ; and if there is such a process, it is the outcome of unconscious cerebration or unconscious intellection.

As on previous occasions, I am indebted to Miss Baddeley and to my son for assistance in preparing the book for publication; also to the publishers and printers for their accuracy and rapidity during its final stages.

J. E. Turner.
Liverpool,
November, 1925.